Analysis of Department of Defense social media policy and its impact on operational security by Leonhardi, Eric V. et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-06
Analysis of Department of Defense social media
policy and its impact on operational security
Leonhardi, Eric V.
Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45890








MBA PROFESSIONAL REPORT 
 
 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SOCIAL 











Thesis Advisor:  Mie-Sophia Augier 
Second Reader: Douglas Brinkley 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE 
June 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
MBA Professional Report 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 
ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY AND 
ITS IMPACT ON OPERATIONAL SECURITY 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Eric V. Leonhardi, Mark Murphy, Hannah Kim 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER 
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
A 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) 
 
The emergence and rapid adoption of social media by society has forced the Department of Defense (DOD) to adapt, and 
ultimately develop and incorporate, social media policy into its cybersecurity strategy. While social media has influenced DOD 
strategy, it has also had a direct impact on the organization’s operational security (OPSEC). DOD personnel using social media 
represent a potential OPSEC risk through the various ways and means in which they utilize social-networking platforms. In 2009, 
the DOD responded to this risk, in part, with a policy to regulate the use of social media. This project analyzes current DOD social 
media policy to determine how it can be changed to improve OPSEC. To address this issue, DOD social media policies from Army 
Cyber Command, Air Force Cyber Command, Fleet Cyber Command, and Marine Force Cyber Command were analyzed by 











14. SUBJECT TERMS 
Social media, social networking, policy, cyber, security, cybersecurity, risk, threat, military, DOD, 
SWOT, strategy, operational security 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
73 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii 
 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE SOCIAL MEDIA POLICY AND 
ITS IMPACT ON OPERATIONAL SECURITY 
 
 
Eric V. Leonhardi, Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy 
 
Mark Murphy, Lieutenant, United States Navy 
 
Hannah Kim, Lieutenant, United States Navy 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 









Authors:  Eric V. Leonhardi 
   Mark Murphy 










William R. Gates 
Dean, Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
 iv 




The emergence and rapid adoption of social media by society has forced the Department 
of Defense (DOD) to adapt, and ultimately develop and incorporate, social media policy 
into its cybersecurity strategy. While social media has influenced DOD strategy, it has 
also had a direct impact on the organization’s operational security (OPSEC). DOD 
personnel using social media represent a potential OPSEC risk through the various ways 
and means in which they utilize social-networking platforms. In 2009, the DOD 
responded to this risk, in part, with a policy to regulate the use of social media. This 
project analyzes current DOD social media policy to determine how it can be changed to 
improve OPSEC. To address this issue, DOD social media policies from Army Cyber 
Command, Air Force Cyber Command, Fleet Cyber Command, and Marine Force Cyber 
Command were analyzed by performing an in-depth review and strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats analysis. 
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A. SOCIAL MEDIA AS A STRATEGIC RESOURCE 
The last decade has witnessed a tremendous increase in communication via social 
media platforms. While this phenomenon has had a significant impact on daily 
communication between individuals, social media platforms have become pervasive 
within organizations (Langer, 2014). The vast majority of public and private 
organizations and agencies have been forced to adapt to this rapidly expanding 
technology. The question is no longer if social media should be embraced; rather, it is 
how best to implement and manage it. 
In 2009, the Department of Defense (DOD) implemented its first version of social 
media policy. The significance of this was two-fold. First, the DOD has a long-standing 
reputation as a laggard in acknowledging and accepting new societal trends and 
influences. Second, while supporting and funding various technological efforts through 
its acquisitions programs, the numerous bureaucratic layers of the agency have had a 
tendency to delay many innovative technologies from getting to the frontlines in a timely 
manner (Weisgerber, n.d.). Not only did the DOD accept this new technology, it has now 
fully implemented it into its network infrastructure to be used as both a strategic and 
operational resource.1 In keeping with that theme, the DOD has utilized social media as a 
way of providing the public, as well as its service members, with a more transparent view 
of its overall mission and strategy. For the DOD to maintain a competitive advantage 
from social media use, however, it must effectively manage and control the incorporation 
and use of social media.2 
                                                 
1 It is important to note that a resource becomes a strategic resource when it creates a sustainable 
competitive advantage for an entity (Jeyarathmm, 2008). Over the last decade, social media has become a 
strategic resource in that it can potentially contribute to the outperformance of one entity over another, with 
the metric of performance being profit or competitive potential (Coate, 2007). 
2 A competitive advantage is enjoyed by an organization when it can outperform competitors. The 
attributes that lead to a competitive advantage are varied and may include superior efficiency, superior 
quality, and/or superior innovation. The metric of performance for a business might consist of return on 
investment or return on assets. To adjust this to a nonbusiness entity, the metric of measurement should be 
adjusted to align with the organization (Jeyarathmm, 2008). 
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While the adoption of social media provides many benefits, there remain a 
number of inherent risks and vulnerabilities. Considering the increasing use of and 
reliance on it as a network resource, social media poses a tremendous risk to the DOD’s 
operational security (OPSEC). Its mismanagement, intentional or not, can have 
immediate and long-lasting, negative impacts, ranging from the operational to strategic 
levels of the DOD. The DOD’s approach allowing each of the military services to 
develop and implement their own independent social media policy creates a significant 
security liability. The risk of cyber exploitation is elevated due to gaps in oversight, 
standardization, procedures, guidelines, education, training, and control measures. 
Therefore, this project analyzes existing DOD social media policy by performing an in-
depth review and strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats (SWOT) analysis to 
determine how DOD policy can be changed to improve OPSEC. The next section of this 
chapter provides background information, as it discusses the growth of Internet and social 
media usage. Further sections in this chapter discuss the purpose of this project, as well 
as its associated research questions, methodology, and organization. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States states the following with 
regard to the importance of information at all levels of government: 
Information remains an important instrument of national power and a 
strategic resource critical to national security. Previously considered in the 
context of traditional nation-states, the concept of information as an 
instrument of national power extends to non-state actors, such as terrorists 
and transnational criminal groups that are using information to further 
their causes and undermine those of the United States government and our 
allies. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, p. I-12) 
The digital divide between individuals, organizations, and nation-states has 
rapidly decreased over the last 15 years. With that, advances in information and 
communication technology, reduced cost and ease of accessibility, and growing necessity 
to incorporate these technologies into society has ushered in a new age, commonly 
known as the “Information Age” (Brinkley, 2014). Many cybersecurity analysts and 
experts, such as Paul Saffo, Dave Burstein, and Danah Boyd, believe that access and 
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control of information is the characteristic that defines the current era of human 
civilization (Andersen & Rainie, 2014). Figure 1 provides a snapshot of increasing 
Internet usage between 2000 and 2010. 
 
Figure 1.  Internet growth rates by age, 2000–2010 (from  
Pew Research Center, 2010). 
Social media allows connected individuals, organizations, communities, and 
businesses to interact and collaborate with each other (Kaplan, 2010). In recent years, 
open Application Program Interface and the technological advances of Web 2.0 have 
resulted in an additional boost to the global use of social media (Hughes, 2015). It 
promotes communication and connects people despite their physical proximity. It also 
permits the dissemination and sharing of information at a much faster rate and to wider 
audiences. The DOD is forced to operate in this dynamic environment, where new 
technologies translate into new-found opportunities, threats, and risks. Lynn (2010) notes, 
“As a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has formally recognized cyberspace as a new 
domain of warfare” (p. 97). Hence, the DOD has been forced to adapt to social media. It 
is now considered an important instrument for gathering and disseminating information 
 4 
in the warfare environment (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2011). This information provides the 
capability “to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp an adversary’s ability to make and 
share decisions” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2013, p. I-1). 
As shown in Figure 2, multiple social media platforms exist that allow user access 
to various forms of real-time information, data, and services (Solis, 2013). Supporting a 
wide range of interests and practices, social media platforms have evolved, allowing 
people to connect through blogs, networks, and/or information sharing such as pictures 
and videos (Solis, 2013). Social media websites allow construction of a public or semi-
public profile within a bounded system, can articulate a list of other users with whom 
they share a connection, and users can view and traverse their list of connections and 
those made by others within the system (Boyd & Ellison, 2007). 
 
Figure 2.  Conversation Prism (from Solis, 2013). 
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A recent study conducted by Pew Research Center, as shown in Figure 3, found 
that, as of January 2014, 74% of Internet users are using social networking sites. This 
number is predicted to grow in the coming years, primarily through Generation Z, which 
is comprised of those people born after 2000.3 Social media and networking is quickly 
becoming the norm throughout much of society. This has now forced organizations to 
address its potential impact and risk on their operations. In doing so, they must develop 
policies and guidelines for effective management of social media, and must consider both 
its internal users as well as external users. 
 
Figure 3.  Social networking sites demographics (from 
Pew Research Center, n.d.). 
 
 
                                                 
3 Generation X was born between 1966 and 1976, Generation Y was born between 1977 and 1994, and 
Generation Z was born after 1995 (Schroer, n.d.). 
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With over 1.3 billion users, Facebook remains the most popular social media site 
in the world (Edwards, 2014); however, as shown in Figure 4, the Pew Research Center 
found that there was no growth in Facebook users for 2013 and 2014 (Duggan, Ellison, 
Lampe, Lenhart, & Madden, 2015b). While Facebook growth has recently abated, other 
social media platforms, such as Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Pinterest, have shown 
significant user growth over the last six years (Duggan et al., 2015b). Another Pew 
Research Center survey, reflected in Figure 5, found that multiplatform use was on the 
rise, with 52% of users stating that they use two social networking sites simultaneously 
(Duggan et al., 2015a). In fact, a smaller, but growing, percentage of users employ five or 
more social networking sites. 
 
Figure 4.  Social media site percent usage by adults, 2012–2014 
(from Duggan et al., 2015b). 
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Figure 5.  Number of social media sites used, 2013 vs. 2014 (from Duggan  
et al., 2015a). 
Many businesses, corporations, and organizations have adopted social media 
platforms and technology to promote global communication, products, services, sales, 
and programs (Kaplan, 2012). A study conducted by Burson-Marstellar in 2010 found 
that 79% of the largest 100 companies in the Fortune 500 use Facebook, Twitter, or some 
other social media platform to assist in the execution of their strategy and daily 
operations. Not only did this trend impact the private sector, it permeated to the public 
domain as well. In February 2010, the DOD released its first policy memorandum on the 
responsible and effective use of Internet-based capabilities, to include social networking 
sites and other Web 2.0 applications (Budzyna, 2009). 
C. PURPOSE 
The widespread use of social media creates both strategic opportunities and 
threats. Joint Chiefs of Staff (2014) focuses on information operations and states the 
following with regard to the importance of information sharing: 
The ability to share information in near real time, anonymously and/or 
securely, is a capability that is both an asset and a potential vulnerability to 
us, our allies, and our adversaries. (p. I-1) 
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Social media presents an individual or organization with the ability to acquire and 
manipulate information. The information posted by rivals can be collected and exploited; 
for this reason, social media content must be regulated. Careless and unregulated usage 
can lead to the release of sensitive or classified information, but even unclassified 
information poses a threat, as it can be collected from a wide variety of open sources and 
compiled to produce information that is useful. Some collection efforts on open-source 
materials can reveal classified knowledge to an adversary. OPSEC deals with the 
regulation of unclassified information to prevent an adversary from gaining valuable 
intelligence by piecing together open-source information. Therefore, leveraging social 
media to the best strategic effect requires a social media policy that promotes OPSEC. 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This project analyzes DOD social media policy and its impact on OPSEC. 
Specifically, the following items will be addressed: 
• What are the strengths and vulnerabilities of the DOD’s social media 
policy in regards to OPSEC? 
• What opportunities exist to strengthen OPSEC through social media 
policy? 
• How can an adversary threaten OPSEC through social media? 
• What modifications to U.S. policy can be made to decrease the strategic 
liabilities of social media? 
E. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
This project is focused solely on the relation between U.S. DOD OPSEC and 
social media. A SWOT analysis was used to analyze current DOD social media policy. 
SWOT analysis aids in analyzing the DOD’s social media policies by identifying the 
internal factors (strengths and weaknesses) and external factors (opportunities and 
threats) that are favorable and unfavorable in regards to OPSEC. The factors are then 
examined to identify competitive advantages, weaknesses that can be improved, and 
threats that can be mitigated. Recommendations are provided to assist in developing 
competitive advantages, while improving upon weaknesses and mitigating threats. 
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
Chapter II reviews cybersecurity initiatives of the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST), the National Security Strategy (NSS), the DOD strategy for 
cyber security, and the social media policies of each branch of the uniformed services. 
Chapter III focuses on a SWOT analysis of the DOD’s social media policy and how it 
relates to OPSEC. The SWOT analysis findings, along with policy change 
recommendations and further research, are concluded in Chapter IV. 
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II. STRATEGIES AND POLICIES 
To better understand how social media policy has been developed and 
implemented into the DOD’s organizational structure, it is important to address its roots 
within the larger cyber security issue faced by both the U.S. government and private 
industry. Over the last 15 years, individual, organizational, and nation-state reliance on 
telecommunication and computer network infrastructure has increased dramatically. 
Increased use of computers, phones, and various forms of wireless media for rapid 
sharing and dissemination of information has become embedded within modern culture 
(Langer, 2014). While tremendous benefits are derived from modern information 
technology (IT), the global network infrastructure remains a vast and unregulated arena 
that is easily exploited by criminal hackers, organized crime syndicates, terrorist 
networks, and advanced nation-states. Utilizing a top-down approach to address this, the 
Obama administration directed both the DOD and Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) to develop and implement an appropriate framework and policy that effectively 
addresses cyber security across both U.S. public and private domains. 
A. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 
President Obama’s 2013 issuance of Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical 
Infrastructure Cyber security, confirmed the acceptance of cyber security as a top priority 
for the national security of the United States (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology [NIST], 2013). The release of this order was significant in that it addressed 
the importance of a unified front to counter the rapid expansion of the global 
cybersecurity threat landscape. It also emphasized that only through collaboration 
between public and private industry can governments and organizations effectively 
protect the critical infrastructure they so heavily depend on (NIST, 2013). 
The NIST, an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce, was subsequently 
chosen to develop a cybersecurity framework that would promote and foster cross-
industry dialogue between agencies and organizations (NIST, 2014). The reason for this 
was two-fold. First, the agency has remained a leading authority and promoter of 
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innovation across a large number of industries and sectors (NIST, 2014). Second, NIST 
has developed a tremendous reputation over the years of promoting collaborative efforts 
between the public and private sectors (NIST, 2014). 
In early 2014, NIST issued its first version of the new cybersecurity framework 
(Huergo, 2014). In keeping with the priorities of Executive Order 13636, the DOD 
promptly conducted an organizational shift from the DOD Information Assurance 
Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) that it had been using since 2007, to 
the newly developed NIST framework. In doing so, the DOD’s cybersecurity standards 
and practices would be matched with those of its civilian counterparts, as well as other 
government agencies. The DOD’s quick shift from the legacy DIACAP process to the 
newer framework further emphasizes the willingness of organizations to establish 
commonality in the policies and procedures they develop and implement (Huergo, 2014). 
The intent of the NIST cybersecurity framework is not to provide a rigid set of 
guidelines for policy development. Rather, it provides a baseline framework that is not 
industry specific and can be applied by agencies and organizations of varying types and 
size (NIST, 2014). This approach fosters top-level commonality, while also allowing 
organizations to tailor the framework to meet their specific needs (NIST, 2014). Through 
effective application, the NIST cybersecurity framework provides: 
• Increased dialogue between industries and organizations. 
• Alignment of cybersecurity policy, procedures, and guidelines. 
• Increased protection of privacy and intellectual property. 
• Reduces response time, through increased information sharing practices, 
to potential cyberattacks and incidences. 
• Increased national security and protection of critical infrastructure.  
(NIST, 2014, p. 3) 
B. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 
Cybersecurity threats represent one of the most serious national security, public 
safety, and economic challenges facing the United States today (White House, 2010). The 
technologies that allow people and organizations to lead and create also empower those 
wishing to disrupt and destroy (White House, 2010). While they support and enable U.S. 
military superiority, the government’s unclassified networks are continuously scanned 
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and probed (White House, 2010). In many instances, and at times unknowingly, these 
networks are compromised (White House, 2010). While the safety and security of U.S. 
citizens depends on critical infrastructure, such as power and electric grids, cyber 
criminals continue to expose vulnerabilities to disrupt them on a massive scale (White 
House, 2010). Their actions result in organizations and consumers losing vast quantities 
of money and valuable intellectual property (White House, 2010). 
National threats are broad in scope and can consist of individual hackers, 
organized criminal groups, terrorist networks, and advanced nation-states (White House, 
2010). These threats to U.S. security and personal privacy require networks and 
infrastructure that are secure, dependable, and responsive (White House, 2010). With that 
comes the inherent responsibility of government agencies and private organizations to 
formulate and execute effective cybersecurity policies and guidelines. The country’s 
network infrastructure is a strategic national asset and therefore makes it a national 
security priority (White House, 2010). 
Facing a rapidly growing threat environment, the United States has determined 
that all agencies and organizations should focus their efforts on investing in human 
capital and technology, while simultaneously strengthening partnerships (White House, 
2010). By doing so, organizations and agencies will be able to effectively deter, prevent, 
detect, defend against, and recover from cyber intrusions and attacks (White House, 
2010). This growing threat environment has prompted the U.S. government to expand its 
efforts to work hand-in-hand with the private sector (White House, 2010). By sharing 
information and strategies, both public and private entities can effectively address a 
multitude of issues to include cybersecurity policies, guidelines, laws, privacy, and 
network defense and response procedures (White House, 2010). While U.S. military 
services and agencies have operated independently with regard to network practices and 
security, the threat landscape of the last decade has forced a change in policy, processes, 
and tactics. This culminated in early 2014, when the DOD adopted the NIST 
cybersecurity framework as a basis for developing an effective and actionable way 
forward in cyberspace (NIST, 2014). 
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C. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE STRATEGY 
The DOD, along with the rest of the U.S. government, depends on cyberspace to 
execute its daily mission. Effective security and operation of critical infrastructure relies 
on cyberspace, industrial control systems, and information technology that may be 
vulnerable to exploitation and disruption techniques (DOD, 2011). Considering that the 
DOD operates over 15,000 networks and seven million computing devices around the 
world, it is easy to see the importance that cyberspace has within the organization (DOD, 
2011). The DOD heavily leverages cyberspace to support military and commercial 
operations, which entails the movement of personnel and materiel, as well as the 
command and control of a wide range of military operations (DOD, 2011). 
Ironically, the DOD’s effective use of cyberspace has been counterbalanced by 
the shortcomings of its cybersecurity policies, guidelines, and procedures (DOD, 2011). 
The continued expansion of networked systems and platforms resulted in cyberspace 
being incorporated into capabilities, which the DOD relies on to execute both its strategy 
and day-to-day operations. Today’s threat environment has proven that criminal hackers, 
organized criminal groups, terrorist networks, and advanced nation-states continue to 
apply exploitation techniques to the department’s networks (DOD, 2011). In fact, some 
foreign intelligence organizations have already acquired the capacity to disrupt critical 
areas of the department’s information infrastructure (DOD, 2011). Further increasing the 
DOD’s problems, non-state actors progressively threaten disruption and penetration of 
the DOD infrastructure. Based on these factors, the DOD has stated that there may be 
malicious activities on the organization’s network infrastructure that has yet to be 
detected (DOD, 2011). 
Working with a number of interagency and international partners, the DOD has 
dedicated a tremendous amount of resources to reducing the risks posed to both U.S. and 
allied cyberspace capabilities (DOD, 2011). Critical to its strategy, the DOD has focused 
on a number of serious factors, to include external threat actors, insider threats, supply 
chain vulnerabilities, and threats to the organization’s operational ability (DOD, 2011). In 
order for its strategy to work, the DOD must properly and effectively identify its 
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vulnerabilities, while mitigating concerted efforts of both state and non-state actors to 
gain unauthorized access to its network infrastructure (DOD, 2011). 
In recent years, foreign cyberspace operations against U.S. public and private 
sector systems increased in both quantity and sophistication (DOD, 2011). Open-source 
intelligence reports identified that DOD networks are probed countless times on a daily 
basis (DOD, 2011). Unfortunately, not all such attempts can be prevented and successful 
penetrations have resulted in the loss of thousands of files from U.S. networks, U.S. allies 
and industry partners (DOD, 2011). Additional evidence has identified an evolution of 
threats, as adversaries focus on the development of increasingly sophisticated and capable 
cyber techniques and strategies (DOD, 2011). 
A growing and persistent threat emanates from small and independent groups, 
which have an asymmetric impact in cyberspace. Asymmetric methods have successfully 
exposed numerous network vulnerabilities, resulting in a realistic incentive and 
motivation for malicious activity (DOD, 2011). One common asymmetric method is 
controlling botnets with millions of infected hosts (DOD, 2011). The tools, techniques, 
and methods developed and applied by cyber criminals are dynamic and continue to 
become more sophisticated. To further exacerbate the problem, many of these can be 
purchased cheaply on the Internet (DOD, 2011). Regardless of whether the goal is access 
to intellectual property, finances, or to disrupt the DOD’s network, evolving cyber threats 
present a significant and complex challenge for both national and economic security 
(DOD, 2011). 
The human element, commonly referred to as “insiders,” poses a grave risk, as 
they commonly exploit their accessibility at the command of foreign governments, 
terrorist groups, criminal elements, or on their own initiative (DOD, 2011). 
Consequences can be devastating for an agency, regardless of activity, whether it is 
conducting espionage, voicing a political statement, or articulating personal disdain 
(DOD, 2011). The insider threat could potentially have an even broader impact on U.S. 
national security (DOD, 2011). 
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An additional challenge for the DOD resides with network software and 
hardware. In the case of foreign-produced software and hardware, a risk of malicious 
tampering exists before integration or installation of the hardware and/or software into 
systems. This can have a direct and detrimental impact on system security (DOD, 2011). 
The DOD’s continued dependence on foreign manufacturing of network components 
creates significant challenges in managing risk in areas of production, assembly, service, 
delivery, and disposal (DOD, 2011). 
The DOD recognizes that cyberspace poses a threat to national security, which 
extends beyond military targets and can have a range of impacts on many aspects of 
society (DOD, 2011). Cyber criminals and organizations have become increasingly more 
capable of launching sophisticated intrusions into the networks and systems that control 
critical civilian infrastructure such as electrical, telecommunication, transportation, and 
financial services (DOD, 2011). Considering the integration of cyberspace, the 
exploitation of power grids, telecommunication, transportation, or financial networks or 
systems could result in significant damage and economic disruption (DOD, 2011). Since 
the DOD utilizes this infrastructure to conduct its operations, both at home and abroad, 
every effort must be made to reduce risk, address network vulnerabilities, and identify 
cyber threats (DOD, 2011). 
Lastly, the DOD has emphasized the most pervasive, yet less visible, form of 
cyber threat, is that of intellectual property theft (DOD, 2011). The U.S. government 
recently stated that, on an annual basis, the amount of intellectual property stolen from 
U.S. networks is greater than the amount of information contained in the Library of 
Congress (DOD, 2011). The effectiveness of the DOD is directly related to U.S. 
economic strength. With such staggering losses of intellectual property, both U.S. 
military capability and economic strength is significantly impacted (DOD, 2011). 
In order to best execute its strategy, the DOD has focused its efforts on five 
strategic initiatives: 
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1. Strategic Initiative I 
Under Initiative I, the DOD has declared cyberspace as an operational domain. 
This requires organizing, training, and equipping personnel so that the agency can take 
full advantage of cyberspace’s potential, while minimizing risks (DOD, 2011). 
Considering that most DOD networks are privately managed and operated, treating 
cyberspace as a domain is a critical concept for the DOD’s national strategy (DOD, 
2011). This approach allows the agency to effectively organize and train personnel for 
operations within cyberspace, in order to support the interests of U.S. national security 
(DOD, 2011). The DOD has also expressed concern that every effort must be made to 
support essential operations within a degraded cyber environment (DOD, 2011). 
By direction of the NSS, the DOD has emphasized the importance of having the 
necessary capabilities to operate effectively in all warfare domains to include air, land, 
maritime, space, and cyberspace (DOD, 2011). To best achieve this goal, the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF) assigned cyberspace mission responsibilities to U.S. Strategic 
Command (USSTRATCOM), the other Combatant Commanders (COCOMS), and each 
of the military services (DOD, 2011). The DOD established U.S. Cyber Command 
(USCYBERCOM) as a subordinate unified command of USSTRATCOM in response to 
its need to operate effectively in cyberspace and adequately organize its resources (DOD, 
2011). The establishment of USCYBERCOM serves three primary needs of the DOD: 
• Manage cyberspace risk by incorporating increased training requirements, 
boosting information assurance qualifications, promoting greater 
situational awareness, and creating more secure DOD networks. 
• Promote integrity and availability by establishing solid partnerships, 
building cross-domain defense mechanisms, and establishing and 
maintaining a common operating picture that is shared by all major 
players. 
• Promote and develop integrated capabilities by working closely with 
Combatant Commands, services, departments, agencies, and the 
acquisition community to deliver and deploy state-of-the-art capabilities 




USSTRATCOM delegated the responsibility for managing and coordinating 
service components within each branch of the military, to include the Army Cyber 
Command (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM), the 24th Air Force 
Cyber Command (AFCYBER), and Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) 
to USCYBERCOM (DOD, 2011). A key organizational concept behind the stand-up of 
USCYBERCOM is its colocation with the National Security Agency (NSA), as the NSA 
director also serves as the Commander of USCYBERCOM (DOD, 2011). Colocation and 
dual-hatting of these separate and distinct organizations allows the DOD and the U.S. 
government to better leverage its respective authorities and manage its resources, both of 
which are critical to achieving the DOD’s cybersecurity strategy (DOD, 2011). 
Degraded cyberspace operations for extended periods are an assumed reality, 
therefore the DOD has designed and integrated a wide range of cyberspace scenarios into 
training and exercises to better prepare military commands for a wide variety of 
contingencies (DOD, 2011). A critical facet of this activity is the implementation of 
cyber “red teams” throughout these exercises and war games (DOD, 2011). Conducting 
training in environments where there is an assumed breach, forces military commands to 
perform and execute at a level that is outside the norm (DOD, 2011). Events such as these 
promote the DOD’s efforts of mission assurance and the preservation of critical operating 
capabilities (DOD, 2011). 
Finally, in order for Initiative I to be effective, every effort must be made to 
ensure the development and establishment of a resilient DOD network infrastructure. In 
the event that there is a failure or a significant compromise to the network, the DOD must 
be able to remain operationally effective. In order to do this, military commands must 
effectively isolate and neutralize threats by using redundant capacity or be able to shift 
operations from one support system to another (DOD, 2011). One way of effectively 
addressing this is by creating multiple networks, which adds diversity, overlap, 
resiliency, and further promotes mission assurance within cyberspace (DOD, 2011). 
Currently, the DOD is researching options for shifting operations to more secure 
networks at scale, which effectively complements the wide range of missions that the 
DOD supports (DOD, 2011). 
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2. Strategic Initiative II 
The primary goal of Initiative II is assurance that the DOD properly and 
effectively employs new operating concepts that provide a functional, defense-in-depth 
capability to both its internal and external network structure (DOD, 2011). The DOD has 
identified a four-step process to achieve this goal. 
• First, the DOD will overhaul and enhance its current cyber practices to 
improve overall network security. 
• Second, to prevent insider threats, the agency is strengthening the 
communication practices of its workforce, increasing accountability 
measures, boosting internal monitoring procedures and practices, and 
increasing overall information management capabilities. 
• The third step has the DOD employing active cyber defense capabilities to 
prevent DOD network intrusions. 
• The final step has the DOD developing and implementing new defensive 
operating concepts and architectures (DOD, 2011, p. 6). 
By incorporating these four steps, the DOD can form a network infrastructure that 
is both adaptive and dynamic, both of which are required, considering the current cyber 
threat landscape (DOD, 2011). 
The DOD recognizes that a large percentage of cyber threats and malicious acts 
can be mitigated by sound cyber policy (DOD, 2011). In doing so, due diligence must be 
practiced at all times by military service members, DOD employees, and supporting 
private industry personnel (DOD, 2011). Protection is a two-fold process that entails 
individual protection, as well as ensuring that the security software and operating systems 
used on a daily basis are up to date and fully operational (DOD, 2011). Effective policy 
must address the maintenance of information security, promote sound cybersecurity 
practices for users and administrators, ensure that network design is secure, and employ 
an effective network configuration (DOD, 2011). The DOD has hardened the 
organization’s network infrastructure by adopting the private sector’s continuous renewal 
method (DOD, 2011). This approach will provide protection, monitoring, maintenance, 
design, and recovery for the agency’s network infrastructure (DOD, 2011). 
Personnel are the first line of defense in ensuring cyber policy effectiveness. They 
also play a critical role in identifying and reducing the number of potential insider threats 
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(DOD, 2011). To best mitigate the insider threat and prevent the release of classified 
information, the DOD started strengthening its current information assurance model 
(DOD, 2011). The agency has also commenced exploring a number of new operating 
concepts to reduce network vulnerabilities (DOD, 2011). The agency continues to focus a 
large percentage of its efforts on personnel training, cross-domain communication, new 
technologies, and streamlined processes (DOD, 2011). By promoting information 
assurance, the DOD believes it can better position the workforce to ensure individual 
responsibility (DOD, 2011). To promote these efforts, the DOD has determined that 
“culture” must be addressed within its new policy structure and training programs  
(DOD, 2011). 
The DOD is implementing a more robust and active cyber defense methodology 
to prevent intrusions and thwart malicious activities on its network (DOD, 2011). The 
DOD defines its active cyber defense approach as a real-time capability to discover, 
detect, analyze, and mitigate threats and vulnerabilities (DOD, 2011). This approach 
builds on the more traditional approaches that the agency has used in defending its 
networks by supplementing best practices with newer and more realistic operational 
guidelines and procedures (DOD, 2011). The DOD has also accepted that intrusions may 
not always be stopped at the network boundary; therefore, the organization must 
prioritize the continued improvement of its advanced sensors to detect, discover, plot, and 
mitigate malicious activity on its network infrastructure (DOD, 2011). By embracing 
both evolutionary and rapid change, the DOD will be able to stay ahead of potential 
threats and reduce its exposure to risks. 
3. Strategic Initiative III 
The DOD has stated that Initiative III will prioritize partnering with other U.S. 
government departments and agencies, as well as the private sector, to facilitate and 
enable a more extensive cybersecurity strategy (DOD, 2011). Considering the threat 
landscape, the challenges of cyberspace cross multiple industries and extend across 
national boundaries, while impacting multiple facets of the global economy (DOD, 
2011). A significant issue is that the DOD’s functionality and operational capabilities rely 
on commercial assets to include Internet service providers (ISP) and global supply 
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entities (DOD, 2011). Ironically, many of the areas over which the DOD operates provide 
no ability or authority for the agency to mitigate its risk exposure (DOD, 2011). This has 
prompted the DOD to work directly with the DHS, selected interagency partners, and the 
private sector to share concepts and techniques (DOD, 2011). By doing so, the DOD can 
develop more advanced capabilities, while supporting collective efforts to meet the cross-
domain challenges of cyberspace (DOD, 2011). 
In pursuit of working more closely with interagency partners, the DOD has stated 
that it will take a broader governmental approach to addressing cybersecurity policy. A 
major step towards this initiative was the 2010 signing of a memorandum of agreement 
between the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense to better align 
and promote collaboration for cybersecurity operations (DOD, 2011). The primary reason 
for strengthening the partnership between the DHS and the DOD was to enhance cyber 
security at the national level in three distinct ways: 
• The first reason was because a more official structure reaffirms the limits 
that current policy and law set on the collaborative effort between the 
DOD and the DHS. 
• The second reason was that a joint relationship in the programming and 
planning phases would boost both department’s overall mission 
effectiveness. Not only would this improve the general understanding of 
cybersecurity needs between the organizations, but it would enhance 
protection in important areas such as privacy and civil liberties. 
• Lastly, by sharing resources and energies to enhance cybersecurity efforts, 
each military service could potentially experience a reduction in budget 
expenditures. (DOD, 2011, p. 8) 
The DOD has strengthened ties with the Defense Industrial Base (DIB) to 
increase the protection of sensitive information (DOD, 2011). The DIB, comprised of 
both public and private agencies and organizations, supports the DOD through the 
delivery of advanced technologies, weapons systems, support mechanisms, and personnel 
(DOD, 2011). To increase protection of both internal and external DIB networks, the 
DOD launched the DIB Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CS/IA) program in 
2007 (DOD, 2011). Using this program as a foundation, the DOD established a public 
and private sector partnership to demonstrate the benefits of increased information 
sharing against cyber threats and to mitigate risk factors (DOD, 2011). 
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The DOD continues to emphasize the importance of building its relationship with 
the DHS to identify and mitigate cyber vulnerabilities within the nation’s critical 
infrastructure (DOD, 2011). To be successful, both agencies must continue to support 
additional pilot programs, business methodologies, and policy frameworks to promote a 
stronger bond between the public and private sectors (DOD, 2011). To be effective, these 
relationships and partnerships must effectively promote innovation, trust, and information 
sharing (DOD, 2011). The DOD’s efforts must also extend beyond large corporations to 
both small- and medium-sized businesses to ensure participation, as well as identify 
potential innovation (DOD, 2011). 
Lastly, the DOD has taken the initiative of promoting a unified governmental 
approach for managing cyber risks at both the national and international levels (DOD, 
2011). This is because many domestic technology firms outsource software production, 
hardware production, and services to overseas organizations (DOD, 2011). Another 
driver is that counterfeit components and products require procedures to reduce risk and 
increase quality control procedures (DOD, 2011). The DOD is currently reducing its 
dependence on technology from untrusted sources, which can have a detrimental effect 
on the information assurance it promotes (DOD, 2011). Interagency cooperation is 
critical to mitigating risks associated with the worldwide technology supply chain  
(DOD, 2011). 
4. Strategic Initiative IV 
The DOD identified the importance of relationship building with allies and 
international partners (DOD, 2011). To support the international strategy for cyberspace, 
the agency has prioritized the building and strengthening of international relationships to 
combat cyberspace threats (DOD, 2011). This has been achieved through the 
development of shared situational awareness and warning capabilities (DOD, 2011). 
Through a unified and collaborative effort, both the DOD and its international partners 
have been able to drastically increase the cyber defense of their respective networks 
(DOD, 2011). 
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The expanse of the cyber domain prevents a single entity, agency, organization, or 
government from maintaining a fail-safe network defense on its own. With that, the DOD 
has stated that international engagement is imperative to successfully execute its 
international strategy for cyberspace (DOD, 2011). To do this, the agency has ramped up 
its efforts to develop and promote international cyberspace procedures, guidelines, and 
norms that promote overall interoperability, security, and reliability (DOD, 2011). The 
agency has also taken a leadership role in encouraging responsible behavior and 
combating entities that threaten critical national and international infrastructure (DOD, 
2011). 
As international cyberspace cooperation continues to develop, the DOD has 
integrated more with its allies and international partners to develop shared warning 
capabilities, engage in capacity building, and conduct joint training exercises (DOD, 
2011). By endorsing proactive engagement, the intent is to generate opportunities to 
initiate dialogues for sharing of best cyber practices in areas such as forensics, capability 
development, and exercise participation (DOD, 2011). An additional benefit is that 
burden-sharing arrangements can play to each nation’s core strengths and capabilities 
(DOD, 2011). This further strengthens critical areas where allies are less proficient, while 
strengthening collective cybersecurity standards (DOD, 2011). 
Lastly, the DOD has recently expanded its cyber cooperation to a wider pool of 
allied and partner militaries to develop more holistic cybersecurity practices and 
principles (DOD, 2011). Through these shared practices and principles, members can 
maximize scarce cyber capabilities, mitigate risk, and create coalitions to deter malicious 
activities in cyberspace (DOD, 2011). A more collaborative effort will serve to augment 
the DOD’s formal alliances, while also increasing the effectiveness of cybersecurity 




5. Strategic Initiative V 
U.S. national security has a direct relationship with many facets of U.S. society. 
In recent years, the DOD has strived to utilize more academic, scientific, and economic 
resources to create a more talented and diverse base of military and civilian personnel to 
execute its cybersecurity strategy and objectives (DOD, 2011). The DOD has stressed the 
importance of fostering innovation through the acquisition processes to increase its 
overall cyberspace capabilities (DOD, 2011). To sustain this approach, the agency must 
continue to invest in people, research and development, and technology (DOD, 2011). 
To meet strategic goals, the DOD has stated that identification, development, and 
retention of a capable workforce are essential to success (DOD, 2011). In order to 
accomplish this objective, the agency will continue to assess its cyber workforce, 
requirements, and capabilities on a periodic basis to maintain relevancy (DOD, 2011). A 
major recruiting concern is establishing the DOD as a competitive employer in 
comparison to private industry (DOD, 2011). To achieve this, the agency has focused on 
the establishment of dynamic programs to attract talent as early as possible (DOD, 2011). 
The agency also participates in human resources development areas associated with the 
2010 Presidential Initiative to further improve recruitment and hiring processes of the 
federal government (DOD, 2011). The DOD is working directly with the Executive 
Branch to explore strategies designed to streamline hiring practices for its cyber 
workforce and exchange programs to allow for cross-flow of cyber professionals between 
both public and private sectors to identify, retain, and foster a more innovative cyber 
workforce (DOD, 2011). 
In recent years, the DOD has fostered the adoption of cross-generational 
mentoring programs to establish and grow a more talented workforce (DOD, 2011). 
Another way of increasing workforce capability is the incorporation of both Reserve and 
National Guard cyber capabilities (DOD, 2011). This will allow for greater diversity, 
capacity, expertise, and flexibility across DOD, federal, state, and private sector activities 
(DOD, 2011). The DOD has also dedicated more resources for continuing education and 
exchange program opportunities (DOD, 2011). The objective of these programs is a more 
entrepreneurial workforce and preservation of intellectual capital (DOD, 2011). 
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In recent years, the DOD has realized it lags behind the private sector regarding 
innovation and applying emerging computing concepts (DOD, 2011). To address this, it 
has adopted five important principles to increase the effectiveness of its acquisition 
processes: 
• The first principle states that both DOD acquisition processes and 
regulations must match the technology development life cycle of the 
private sector (DOD, 2011). Having been implemented, the agency has 
shown a drastic reduction in its mean cycle times from years to months. 
• The second principle addresses the employment of incremental 
development and testing practices, rather than a single deployment of 
large and complex cyber systems. 
• The third principle emphasizes DOD willingness to sacrifice or defer some 
customization to achieve more rapid and incremental improvements. 
• The fourth principle promotes the importance of adopting varying levels 
of oversight based on the agency’s prioritization of critical systems. 
• Lastly, the DOD has made great efforts to improve both the software and 
hardware security of products and services that they acquire. 
(DOD, 2011, p. 11) 
Applying and executing these five principles has had a positive effect on the DOD’s 
ability to manage its acquisition process, as well as mitigate its cyber risk (DOD, 2011). 
Recently, the DOD has promoted opportunities for small- and medium-sized 
businesses. To achieve this, the agency works with entrepreneurs in established U.S. 
technological innovation hubs to move concepts at a rapid rate from innovative idea, to 
pilot program, to scaled adoption across the DOD enterprise (DOD, 2011). This has 
increased accessibility to innovative technology and ideas, as well as fostered 
collaboration across the scientific community and the public sector. This forward-leaning 
approach has increased the DOD’s exposure to more advanced cybersecurity 
architectures and methodologies, both of which are crucial to boosting its network 
defense. 
The recent development and employment of the National Cyber Range—a large, 
joint training platform—has played a critical part in allowing the DOD, its partners, and 
international allies to deploy, test, and evaluate new cyberspace concepts, policies, and 
technologies (DOD, 2011). This has been a huge upgrade to the DOD’s overall network 
capability, considering that until recently many military commands had limited access to 
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areas to conduct cyber simulations and exercises (DOD, 2011). By providing a means to 
rapidly employ and conduct real-time testing of innovative cyber architectures and 
methodologies, the National Cyber Range has made an immediate impact on DOD and 
U.S. national strategic network infrastructure defense. 
The DOD has encouraged private sector participation in cyberspace development 
by empowering organizations to serve as clearing houses for innovative concepts and 
technologies (DOD, 2011). The agency has started incorporating a system that rewards 
those firms that develop impactful and innovative technologies. In recent years, the 
agency has more effectively leveraged the innovation and agility of small businesses and 
entrepreneurs through the use of such initiatives as Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR), creative joint ventures, and targeted grants and investments. 
D. SOCIAL MEDIA POLICIES 
1. U.S. Strategic Command 
In June 2009, the SECDEF directed the Commander of USSTRATCOM to 
establish a subordinate unified command identified as USCYBERCOM (United States 
Strategic Command, 2015). Full operational capability (FOC) was rapidly achieved in 
October 2010. Located at Fort Meade, Maryland, USCYBERCOM plans, coordinates, 
integrates, synchronizes, and conducts activities to: 
• Direct the operations and defense of specified DOD information networks. 
• Prepare, and on direction, conduct a wide range of cyberspace operations 
and actions across all identified domains. 
• Ensure U.S. military and allied freedom of action in cyberspace, while 
maintaining adversarial denial capabilities. 
• Defend the DOD information network. 
• Provide support to all COCOMS for execution of their missions 
throughout the world. 
• Strengthen the nation’s ability to withstand and respond to advanced 
cyberattacks. (United States Strategic Command, 2015, p. 1) 
There were many reasons for the establishment of USCYBERCOM. It unifies the 
direction of cyberspace operations, strengthens DOD cyberspace capabilities, and 
integrates and bolsters the DOD’s cyber expertise (United States Strategic Command, 
2015). It also improves the DOD’s capabilities to operate resilient and reliable networks, 
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counter cyberspace threats, and assure access to cyberspace (United States Strategic 
Command, 2015). Upon its inception, USCYBERCOM began to immediately address the 
DOD’s cyber workforce structure, as well as the training requirements and certification 
standards that enable each of the DOD services to build the cyber force required to 
execute their assigned missions (United States Strategic Command, 2015). Lastly, 
USCYBERCOM works closely with interagency, private industry, and international 
allies to execute its overall mission (United States Strategic Command, 2015). 
Through its broad cybersecurity framework, USCYBERCOM allows each service 
element to establish its own distinct set of guidelines with regard to social media 
application and use (United States Strategic Command, 2015). Command service 
elements include ARCYBER, AFCYBER, Fleet Cyber FLTCYBERCOM, and 
MARFORCYBER (United States Strategic Command, 2015). While each policy is 
unique to each of the services, there remain a number of distinct similarities; however, 
the debate continues as to whether or not current social media adequately addresses 
OPSEC within the DOD. 
2. DOD Service Policies 
In the Appendix section of this project, the following policies are analyzed: The 
overall instruction set forth by the DOD in regards to the use of Internet services and 
Internet-based capabilities; U.S. Army guidelines for the use of social media; U.S. Air 
Force’s version; U.S. Navy’s version, and the U.S. Marine Corps’ version. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS 
A. METHODOLOGY 
For a chosen strategy to be successful, organizations must be able to identify and 
adapt to the rapidly changing environment they operate within. Not only does this depend 
on effectively analyzing the external environment, it requires an organization to properly 
assess its internal capabilities and how best to utilize them to respond to external factors 
(“SWOT Analysis,” 2013). One common method of doing this is through the application 
of a SWOT analysis (“SWOT Analysis,” 2013). When applied, SWOT allows 
organizations to more accurately identify and address complex issues that have the most 
impact on their operations and strategy (“SWOT Analysis,” 2013). 
The concept of SWOT analysis was first described by Edmund P. Learned,  
C. Roland Christiansen, Kenneth Andrews, and William D. Guth in Business Policy, Text 
and Cases during the 1960s (“SWOT Analysis,” 2013). In essence, SWOT analysis is an 
analytical framework that evaluates an organization’s respective strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats relative to its strategy (“SWOT Analysis,” 2013). This is done 
by identifying the internal factors (strengths and weaknesses) and external factors 
(opportunities and threats) that are favorable and unfavorable, with the goal of achieving 
an attainable strategy (“SWOT Analysis,” 2013). When successfully applied, it reveals 
opportunities that can be exploited and further mitigates threats by understanding those 
weaknesses that have been identified (Goodrich, 2015). 
While a SWOT analysis is typically conducted in a 4 x 4 matrix, generating a list 
is also acceptable as long as it is comprised of each of the four key elements: 
• Strengths: Consists of those positive factors that are internal to the 
organization and that provide the organization with a competitive 
advantage over its competitors. 
• Weaknesses: Consists of those negative factors internal to the 





• Opportunities: Those positive external factors that increase and support 
organizational performance. 
• Threats: Those negative external factors that are beyond the 
organization’s control and that could degrade overall performance. 
(“SWOT Analysis,” 2013, p. 11) 
B. ANALYSIS 
With the SWOT identified, analysis is conducted to determine potential courses of 
action to achieve the objective. The analysis performed is commonly referred to as 
matching and converting. Matching is conducted by matching strengths to opportunities 
and converting. When strengths are matched to appropriate opportunities, a competitive 
advantage is developed. Conversion is conducted by converting weaknesses into 
strengths and threats into opportunities. The conversion takes the negative attributes of an 
organization and converts them into positive aspects. Conversion may not be possible in 
all situations; in these cases, mitigation of weaknesses and threats should be considered. 
Table 1 is an example of a SWOT matrix. 
 An example of a SWOT matrix. Table 1.  
 POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
INTERNAL Strengths Weaknesses 
EXTERNAL Opportunities Threats 
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IV. FINDINGS, SUMMARY, AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. FINDINGS 
Table 2 provides a snapshot of the findings as a result of applying a SWOT 
analysis to the DOD’s current social media policy: 
 A DOD SWOT matrix. Table 2.  
 POSITIVE NEGATIVE 
 Strengths Weaknesses 
INTERNAL • Acceptance of social media 
• Authority to enforce policy 
• Lack of OPSEC consideration 
and guidance 
• Lack of oversight 
• Social media tied to personnel 
rights 
 Opportunities Threats 
EXTERNAL • Collaboration with private 
industries 
• Monitor social media 
• Geotagging 
• Data mining 




The SWOT analysis of each branch’s social media policy yielded close to 
identical results. The only deviation worth noting is in the U.S. Army’s policy. The 
Army’s policy provides the best OPSEC guidance and the only discussion of the threat 
environment. The discussion of the threat environment provides a basic overview of 
OPSEC’s importance and the consequences of careless use, providing valuable insight 




Analysis of DOD social media policy yielded two strengths. The first and greatest 
strength is the acceptance of social media by the DOD. Choosing to adapt and embrace 
social media was the right choice for the DOD, as its acceptance allows the DOD to 
engage with personnel and educate them on safe social media practices. Prohibition of 
social media would have likely encouraged clandestine use by personnel without having 
received any education on safe practices. Social media use by DOD organizations 
provides several effective networks, which the DOD can use to alert personnel about 
OPSEC threats and provide guidance to mitigate threats. Additionally, social media 
acceptance permits the DOD to leverage future social media opportunities. 
The second strength of the DOD’s policy is its authority to regulate personnel 
conduct. Policy establishes the expectations of an organization, but achieving the desired 
objectives relies on enforcing expectations. The DOD has the authority to exert control 
over personal conduct, which permits enforcement of DOD social media policy. 
2. Weaknesses 
Analysis of DOD social media policy produced three weaknesses. The first 
notable weakness is a lack of OPSEC consideration and guidance. The current policy 
focuses primarily on personnel conduct of, emphasizing that personnel should represent 
their organization in a respectable manner while operating online. The services’ policies, 
however, inadequately address OPSEC. The Navy and Air Force policies fail to even 
mention OPSEC, while the Marine Corps’ policy just briefly mentions the topic. Only the 
Army policy provides guidance on maintaining OPSEC. This leaves OPSEC, a major 
threat to social media use, largely unaddressed by DOD policy. 
The second identified weakness is an inherent lack of oversight. DOD social 
media policy does not require oversight of personnel using social media, which leaves the 
DOD vulnerable to breaches in OPSEC. Oversight provides a mechanism to detect policy 
violations, with the desire that internal detection occurs before information can be 
gathered and exploited by adversaries. 
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Lastly, social media usage is tied to personal rights. Despite the liability created 
by DOD personnel using social media, the DOD policy is limited in actions it can take to 
address the liability. The simple answer—to forbid social media use by DOD 
personnel—would infringe on military members’ freedom of speech, as guaranteed by 
the First Amendment. Even if the DOD could defeat legal challenges to prohibition of 
social media use by its members, the action would likely create problems in retention and 
recruitment, especially of younger personnel. Regardless of its desires, the DOD is forced 
to balance OPSEC with the rights of its members. 
3. Opportunities 
Two significant opportunities exist for improving OPSEC through changes to the 
DOD’s social media policy. Adoption of social media platforms has bolstered dialogue 
between the DOD and the private sector. The first opportunity is policy change aimed at 
promoting DOD collaboration with private industry to develop a policy that addresses 
OPSEC and technical solutions, which can aid the DOD in monitoring the social media 
activity of members. There may be resistance to aid the DOD in monitoring its members’ 
activities, but some companies may be willing to assist, since the monitoring is not 
clandestine. 
The second opportunity is the addition of a directive to DOD social media policy 
that requires online monitoring of DOD personnel using social media. The policy change 
is an attempt to prevent OPSEC breaches by removing compromised information before 
it can be exploited. The monitoring would not be hidden from DOD personnel. 
4. Threats 
DOD social media policy does not provide policy users with an adequate picture 
of the threat environment. What’s more, the DOD’s policy does not adequately address 
the threat that hackers, geo-tagging, data mining, and social engineering pose to OPSEC 
through social media. Hackers, which can consist of individuals, organized criminal 
groups, terrorist networks, and advanced nation states, remain a chief concern of the 
DOD (White House, 2010). These entities utilize a number of varying methods to exploit 
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social media and networking platforms. Geo-tagging4 and data mining5 are both 
significant concerns for the DOD, as these methods are commonly utilized to exploit it 
and its service members. Another major threat exists through social engineering.6 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
While the DOD’s adoption of social media into its network infrastructure has 
provided a number of benefits, its current social media policy, and that of each of the 
military services, suffers tremendously from a lack of direction, uniformity, and effective 
management with regard to OPSEC. Not only do these flaws present a significant risk to 
the operations, personnel, and networks of the DOD, they pose a significant threat to the 
national security of the United States. In order to best address OPSEC, USCYBERCOM 
must ensure that the DOD’s social media policy provides effective guidance, oversight, 
and training. While each of these plays its own distinct role in policy development, all are 
highly dependent on one another to be effective in mitigating OPSEC incidences. 
1. Guidance 
Current policy set forth by USCYBERCOM lacks the appropriate level of 
guidance that is required by each of the services. This flaw results in each branch 
developing their own social media policy. While this affords each of the services the 
ability to tailor their particular policy to their respective needs, the end result is a 
significant gap in uniformity. In order to address this risk factor, USCYBERCOM must 
provide a more structured set of guidelines and hold each of the services accountable for 
operating within a designated set of parameters. 
Additionally, USCYBERCOM must increase its dialogue with the private sector. 
This allows for increased exposure to alternative approaches to policy development and 
                                                 
4 Geo-tagging is the process of adding geographical information to various media in metadata form 
(“What Is Geo-Tagging,” 2014). 
5 Data mining is the process of analyzing data from a number of different perspectives and putting it 
into a useful format (Alexander, 2014). 
6 Social engineering is a nontechnical method where a hacker attempts to manipulate individuals to 
gain access to confidential information or access to a network. The manipulation is aided by gaining an 
understanding of one’s social circles, which provides insight into choosing the best method for exploiting a 
target (Criddle, n.d.). 
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guidance. It also increases exposure to current social media and networking trends. Early 
visibility can play a key role in the organization’s ability to adapt to any significant 
changes in social media trends. 
2. Oversight 
The best laws and regulations are meaningless unless there is oversight to ensure 
that they are followed. With that in mind, three solutions have been identified to provide 
oversight of DOD personnel’s social media usage. First, service members and civilian 
personnel must be screened on entry into their respective service to determine what social 
media sites they use. Additionally, they will be instructed to provide updates to their 
command if they adopt additional social media sites during their tenure. This will provide 
the DOD with a list of social media profiles that require monitoring. Failure to provide 
accurate information will subject the service member to administrative action at the 
command level. 
The second solution is to monitor service member and civilian personnel activity 
on social media. The list of active social media profiles developed from the screening 
process will be evaluated periodically, which will require the development of an 
automated search system. Search protocols can then be applied to search for specific key 
words, dates, times, and photos. The metadata in the photos can then be searched for GPS 
coordinates to determine if service members are posting pictures of sensitive locations. In 
the event that a profile is flagged, the service member’s command will be notified. 
Lastly, commands will be required to document all OPSEC violations occurring 
on social media. This will be aided by the automated search system. All commands will 
be required to submit reports of violations to USCYBERCOM, which will allow them to 
develop data on violations. The data can then be analyzed to provide metrics that describe 
personnel at risk of committing OPSEC violations throughout the DOD. 
3. Training 
The human element is the number one threat to OPSEC. Therefore, periodic 
training for DOD personnel should occur to help ensure that OPSEC is maintained at all 
times. It is recommended that all service members and civilian personnel be required to 
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take the OPSEC Awareness training provided by the Center for Development of Security 
Excellence, on a semiannual basis. This course, whether completed online or in-house, 
provides basic information to protect unclassified information at both the personal and 
operational levels (Joint Knowledge Online, n.d.). Additionally, every command at all 
levels of the DOD must be required to conduct semiannual social media and networking 
use training. The benefit of this is two-fold: it reinforces the broader training received 
from the Center for Development of Security Excellence, while also holding each 
respective command accountable for the actions of their personnel. 
D. AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
The cybersecurity threat landscape is rapidly changing. Included in this, are the 
ongoing cultural shifts in social media and networking adaptation, and social media use 
by both individuals and organizations. It is important to note that the analysis, 
conclusions, and recommendations provided in this project represent a relatively specific 
viewpoint for a very broad subject matter. In order to increase understanding of social 
media’s impact on DOD OPSEC, we recommend the following be considered when 
conducting future research and analysis: 
• Conduct a CLASSIFIED SWOT analysis 
• Explore further integration of private industry policy into DOD policy 
• Analyze and compare OPSEC incidents between services to better 
determine potential causal factors 
• Analyze and compare OPSEC incidents between warfare domains, within 
each service, to better determine potential causal factors 
• Conduct analysis to determine which social media platforms have a higher 
percentage of OPSEC-related incidents 
• Compare demographic factors and their potential relationship with OPSEC 
incidents 
• Analyze and compare OPSEC incidents between different countries7 
• Conduct analysis using alternative methods such as the value, rarity, 
imitability, and organizations (VRIO) framework8 
                                                 
7 The United Kingdom’s cybersecurity strategy was published in November 2011, and is available on 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/60961/uk-cyber-security-
strategy-final.pdf (Cabinet Office, 2011). 
8 The value, rarity, imitability, and organizations (VRIO) framework was developed and introduced by 
Jay B. Barney as a strategic management tool to analyze a company’s internal resources and capabilities in 
order to sustain competitive advantage (Barney, 1995). 
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APPENDIX.  DOD SOCIAL MEDIA INSTRUCTIONS EXCERPTS 
The following are from the official social media instructions provided by the 
DOD, Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. 
 
Department of Defense Internet Services and Internet-Based Capabilities 
(Department of Defense, 2012) 
(Department of Defense, 2014) 
 
PURPOSE. This Instruction: 
 
A) Incorporates and cancels Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, and 
Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09–026. 
B) Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and provides instructions for 
establishing, operating, and maintaining DOD Internet services on 
unclassified networks to collect, disseminate, store, and otherwise process 
unclassified DOD information. Use of Internet-based capabilities (IbC) to 
collect, disseminate, store, and otherwise process unclassified DOD 
information. 
 
APPLICABILITY. This Instruction:  
 
A) Applies to OSD, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office 
of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, 
the DOD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the 
DOD (hereinafter referred to collectively as the “DOD Components”).  
B) Applies to DOD Internet services and use of IbC provided by morale, welfare, 
and recreation (MWR), military exchanges, and lodging programs for use by 
authorized patrons.  
C) Applies to contractors and other non-DOD entities that are supporting DOD 
mission-related activities or accessing DOD Internet services or IbC via DOD 
information systems, to the extent provided in the contract or other instrument 
by which such authorized support or access is provided.  
 
Does NOT:  
 
A) Prevent unit commanders or Heads of the DOD Components from providing 
alternate, stand-alone capabilities to allow access to IbC for mission or 
morale purposes.  
B) Prohibit DOD employees from using IbC from personal Internet-capable 
devices for personal purposes.  
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C) Apply to using IbC specifically for penetration testing, communications 
security monitoring, network defense, personnel misconduct and law 
enforcement investigations, and intelligence-related operations. 
 
POLICY. It is DOD policy that:  
 
A) Decisions to collaborate, participate, or to disseminate or gather information 
via DOD Internet services or IbC shall balance benefits and vulnerabilities. 
Internet infrastructure, services, and technologies provide versatile 
communication assets that must be managed to mitigate risks to national 
security; to the safety, security, and privacy of personnel; and to Federal 
agencies.  
B) DOD Internet services and IbC used to collect, disseminate, store, or 
otherwise process DOD information shall be configured and operated in a 
manner that maximizes the protection (e.g., confidentiality, integrity, and 
availability) of the information, commensurate with the risk and magnitude of 
harm that could result from the loss, compromise, or corruption of the 
information. This applies to both public and non-public DOD information. 
With regard to use of IbC, this applies to the integrity and availability of 
public DOD information. IbC shall not be used to collect, disseminate, store, 
or otherwise process non-public DOD information, as IbC are not subject to 
Federal or DOD information assurance (IA) standards, controls, or 
enforcement, and therefore may not consistently provide confidentiality.  
C) DOD information systems (IS) hosting DOD Internet services shall be 
operated and configured to meet the requirements in DOD 8500.01E and 
DODI 8500.2, and certified and accredited in compliance with DODI 
8510.01. 
D) Effective information review procedures for clearance and release 
authorization for DOD information to the public are conducted in compliance 
with DODD 5230.09 and DODI 5230.29. DOD information intended for non-
public audiences requires similar review and consideration prior to 
dissemination. DOD employees shall be educated and trained to conduct both 
organizational and individual communication effectively to deny adversaries 
the opportunity to take advantage of information that may be inappropriately 
disseminated.  
E) Public DOD websites shall be operated in compliance with established laws 
and requirements. Detailed explanations, and implementation guidance are 
provided at the Web Manager’s Advisory Council website at 
http://www.howto.gov/web-content/.  
F) DOD Internet services and the information disseminated via these services, 
where appropriate, shall be made available to Federal initiatives such as 
Data.gov, Recovery.gov, and USA.gov to reduce duplication and to foster 
greater participation, collaboration, and transparency with the public. Where 
feasible and appropriate, such DOD information shall be provided as datasets 
in raw (machine readable) format as defined in DepSecDef Memorandum. 
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G) All unclassified DOD networks (e.g., Non-classified Internet Protocol Router 
Network (NIPRNET), the Defense Research and Engineering Network) shall 
be configured to provide access to IbC across all the DOD Components.  
H) Authorized users of unclassified DOD networks shall comply with all laws, 
policies, regulations, and guidance concerning communication and the 
appropriate control of DOD information referenced throughout this 
Instruction regardless of the technology used. Furthermore, all personal use 
of IbC by means of Federal government resources shall comply with 
paragraph 2–301 of DOD 5500.7-R. 
 
Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER) 
(Brown, 2012) 
(Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Public Affairs, 2013) 
(United States Army, 2011) 
 
The Army recognizes that social media gives personnel the ability to communicate 
expeditiously with larger audiences in a number of different ways. It has become an 
important tool for Army messaging and outreach. The Army uses a variety of social 
media platforms designed to support a range of media from text, audio, pictures and 
videos, all of which are generated and maintained by organizations and individuals 
within the department. The Army understands the risks associated with social media and 
has developed training to help both Soldiers and family members use social media 
responsibly. 
 
Social media is a powerful communications tool and when used correctly, it can help 
Army commands reach an enormous audience. Social media can help organizations 
engage in the conversation while at the same time promoting awareness of the 
organization’s main communication priorities. But not all Army commands use it 
effectively. Most of social media failures can be attributed to organizations rushing into 
social media before determining what exactly the organization aims to achieve with 
social media platforms. Using social media effectively is a process and it requires 
strategy, goals, manpower and foresight. 
 
Soldiers have always been the Army’s best and most effective messengers. Within today’s 
warfare environment, social media enables the Army family around town, around the 
country and around the world to stay connected and spread the organization’s key 
themes and messages. Every time a member of the service joins social media, it increases 
the timely and transparent dissemination of information. It ensures that the Army’s story 
is shared honestly and directly to Americans where they are and whenever they want to 
see, read or hear it. Social media allows every Soldier to be a part of the Army story and 
it allows America to connect with the service component. Social media is a cheap, 
effective and measurable form of communication. The Army uses social media to tell the 
Army’s story, but it also uses social media to listen. 
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Developing a successful social media presence does not happen overnight, it is a detailed 
process that requires extensive planning and execution. It starts with stating the 
organization’s missions, messages and themes. Once an organization establishes a 
direction, it can begin to develop a detailed social media communication strategy that 
provides input into all the social media platforms supported by the organization. The 
purpose of using social media is to place your unit’s messages in the social media space. 
However, in order to keep people coming back to the pages, units should develop a 
strategy that mixes messages with items the audience finds interesting. Language should 
be conversational, fun and engaging. It must also be noted that official use of social 
media platforms must be in compliance with Army public affairs policy. Content must be 
in the public domain or approved for release by the commanding officer. Commands are 
ultimately responsible for content posted on their platforms. 
 
The Army classifies social media sites as External Official Presences (EOP’s). In 2010, 
the office of the Secretary of the Army released a delegation of authority approving the 
use of EOPs. This directive covers both command units as well as Army Family 
Readiness Groups. All Army EOP’s must adhere to the following standards. The Office of 
the Chief of Public Affairs has the right to deny any page during the approval process if 
one or more of the following standards are not met: 
 
A) Whenever the option is available, EOP’s should be categorized as a 
government page.  
B) Installation Facebook pages should be named U.S. Army XXX (e.g. U.S. Army 
Fort Riley). For other pages, include the Commander-approved names and 
logos (e.g. 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division [Family Readiness]), not 
nicknames nor mascots (e.g.”Dragons”).  
C) Branding (official name and logos) across all social media platforms (i.e. 
Facebook, Twitter, Google+) should be uniform. If needed, use 
http://www.army.mil/create/ to download the Army’s social media branding 
toolkit.  
D) Include a statement acknowledging this is the “official [Facebook, Twitter, 
Google+, etc.] page of [enter your unit or organizations name here] [Family 
Readiness].” 
E) Include contact information (AKO email address).  
F) Facebook pages must include “Posting Guidelines” under “General 
Information.” Use the U.S. Army’s Facebook rules of engagement 
(http://www.facebook.com/USarmy/info) as a reference and/or visit the 
Department   of Defense Social Media user agreement at 
http://www.defense.gov/socialmedia/user-agreement.aspx.  
G) Be recent and up-to-date. Updates must not be older than one month.  
H) Ensure Operations Security Training is completed on an annual basis. The  
Information Assurance Training Center offers the Social Media and 
Operations   Security Training Course: https://ia.signal.army.mil/sms.asp. 
EOP operators must also take the Defense Information Systems Agency’s 
social networking class: http://iase.disa.mil/eta/sns_v1/sn/launchPage.htm.  
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I) FRSAs/FRG leaders should provide all page administrators and FRG 
members with the U.S. Army Social Media OPSEC presentation and the FBI 
Briefing on Identity Theft located on the U.S. Army’s share site at 
www.slideshare.net/usarmysocialmedia 
J) Page administrators are solely responsible for ensuring that the content 
posted on EOP’s adheres to Operations Security guidelines. Administrative 
departments are responsible for documenting and removing any OPSEC 
violations prior to bringing them to the attention of their local OPSEC Officer 
or the U.S. Army’s OPSEC Program Manager.  
K) EOP’s should not be used as a place for personal advertisements nor 
endorsements.  
L) All pages must be registered through the U.S. Army at 
www.army.mil/socialmedia. Prior to submitting a link for inclusion on the 
registry, users must confirm that social media pages adhere to the submission 
guidelines.  
 
Since social media use is so commonplace in our day-to-day interactions, it is easy to 
become complacent. In order to maintain OPSEC, it is important to remain vigilant at all 
times. Sharing seemingly trivial information online can be dangerous to loved ones and 
fellow Soldiers—and may even get them killed. America’s enemies scour blogs, forums, 
chat rooms and personal websites to piece together information that can harm the U.S. 
and its Soldiers. One recommendation is to never accept a friend request from someone 
you don’t know, even if they know a friend of yours. Another is to not share information 
that you don’t want to become public. Someone might target you for working in the DOD 
and one should exercise caution when listing your job, military organization, education 
and contact information. Providing too much information in your profile can leave you 
exposed to people who want to steal your identity or sensitive operational information. 
Understanding what you can and cannot post on social media platforms goes a long way 
in protecting yourself online, but adjusting your privacy settings can do more. 
 
Another area of concern entails geotagging. Geo-tagging is the process of adding 
geographical identification to photographs, videos, websites and SMS messages. It is the 
equivalent of adding a 10-digit grid coordinate to everything posted on the Internet. 
Some smartphones and digital cameras automatically embed geotags into pictures, and 
many people unknowingly upload photos to the Internet that contain location 
information. A variety of applications are capitalizing on user desire to broadcast their 
geographic location. The increased popularity of location-based social networking is 
changing the way we view security and privacy on an individual level and creating 
OPSEC concerns on an Army level. One Soldier exposing their location can affect the 
entire mission. Deployed Soldiers or personnel conducting operations in classified areas 
should not use location-based social networking services. These services will bring the 





Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER) 
(United States Air Force, 2009) 
 
In the past, the Air Force did not officially engage blogs or other forms of social media. 
Air Force leaders now realize the broad reach, both positive and negative; these forms of 
communication have on Airmen and society, as well as the value of maintaining a 
presence in this information domain. While communication with media and the public 
has traditionally been the responsibility of Public Affairs, today all Airmen are 
communicators. All Airmen are encouraged to use social media to communicate about 
topics within their areas of expertise, or their interests. The more traditional form of 
vertical communication is critical for the Air Force, but new technologies give Airmen 
the opportunity to horizontally inform the media, the public and each other. 
 
In an effort to manage resources more effectively, the Air Force issued a policy to end its 
long-standing tradition of producing printed base newspapers in lieu of online 
publications. This action provides a good start for the Air Force to take advantage of 
disseminating its news via Web 2.0 avenues. Progress is being made toward helping 
Airmen engage each other across the social media spectrum with a higher goal of 
transparently reaching out to industry leaders, other agencies and the general public. 
The Air Force is currently creating an official, and active, presence in the larger world of 
social media and with the help of Airmen that presence will grow and flourish. 
 
Strong social media policies and guidelines are necessary to actively engage Web 2.0 
applications and Internet audiences. The guidelines allow Airmen to understand what is 
and is not allowed, thereby setting expectations. Good policies can also help protect 
people from getting in trouble. Considering that security is critical and is at the source, 
all policies will be reviewed by Air Force officials to ensure that legal and ethical 
problems are addressed. Airmen should note that anytime they engage in social media 
they are representing the Air Force and therefore should not do anything that will 
discredit himself or herself or the organization. In general, the Air Force views personal 
Websites and blogs positively, and it respects the rights of Airmen to use them as a 
medium of self-expression. 
 
In today’s warfare environment, Airmen must abide by certain restrictions to ensure 
good order and discipline. All Airmen are on duty 24 hours a day, 365 days a year and 
all actions are subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). Even if Airmen 
state they are not representing the Air Force other audiences may not interpret the 
information that way. Airmen, by the nature of the business, are always on the record and 
must always represent the core values, even on the Web: integrity first, service before self 







Current Air Force guidelines consist of the following: 
 
A) No Classified Info: Do not post classified or sensitive information (for 
example, troop movement, force size, weapons details, etc.). If in doubt, talk to 
your supervisor or security manager. 
B) Replace Error With Fact, Not Argument:  When you see misrepresentations 
made about the Air Force in social media, you may certainly use your blog or 
someone else’s to point out the error. Always do so with respect and with the 
facts. When you speak to someone with an adversarial position, make sure 
that what you say is factual and is not disparaging. Avoid arguments. 
C) Admit Mistakes:  Be the first to respond to your own mistakes. If you make an 
error, be up front about your mistake and correct it quickly. If you choose to 
modify an earlier post, make it clear that you have done so (such as by using 
the strikethrough function). 
D) Use Your Best Judgment:  Remember there are always consequences to what 
you write. If you’re still unsure, and the post is about the Air Force, discuss 
your proposed post with your supervisor. Ultimately, however, you have sole 
responsibility for what you choose to post to your blog. 
E) Avoid The Offensive:  Do not post any defamatory, libelous, vulgar, obscene, 
abusive, profane, threatening, racially and ethnically hateful, or otherwise 
offensive or illegal information or material. 
F) Avoid Copyright:  Do not post any information or other material protected by 
copyright without the permission of the copyright owner. 
G) Don’t Breach Trademarks: Do not use any words, logos or other marks that 
would infringe upon the trademark, service mark, certification mark, or other 
intellectual property rights of the owners of such marks without the 
permission of such owners. 
H) Don’t Violate Privacy:  Do not post any information that would infringe upon 
the proprietary, privacy or personal rights of others. 
I) Avoid Endorsements:  Do not use the Air Force name to endorse or promote 
products, opinions or causes. 
J) No Impersonations:  Do not forge or otherwise manipulate identifiers in your 
post in an attempt to disguise, impersonate or otherwise misrepresent your 
identity or affiliation with any other person or entity. 
K) Use Disclaimers:  Identify to readers of a personal social media site or post 
that the views you express are yours alone and that they do not necessarily 
reflect the views of the Air Force. Use a disclaimer such as: “The postings on 
this site are my own and don’t necessarily represent Air Force positions, 
strategies or opinions.” 
L) Stay in Your Lane:  Discussing issues related to your AFSC or personal 
experiences is acceptable but do not discuss areas of expertise for which you 
have no background or knowledge. 
M) Link:  You may provide a link from your site to an Air Force website. 
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There are movements within the DOD to explore a broader, more aggressive and holistic 
approach that must be developed and employed in order to integrate. The rules of the 
game have clearly changed. Until now, the Air Force has not had an official stance on 
engaging bloggers, social media and Web 2.0 initiatives. However, by being a part of this 
trend, the organization’s Public Affairs department is embarking into a new world of 
communication for the Air Force. Because Airmen are the voice of the organization, he 
Public Affairs department has the responsibility to tell the Air Force story in a 
thoughtful, engaging and exciting manner by taking advantage of the same popular Web 
2.0 tools and services used by corporate and industry leaders. 
 
 
Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBERCOM) 
(Department of the Navy, Office of the Secretary, 2012) 
 
The mission of the U.S. Navy’s Fleet Cyber Command is to serve as the central 
operational authority for networks, cryptologic/signals intelligence, information 
operations, cyber, electronic warfare, and space capabilities in support of forces afloat 
and ashore. It is also to direct Navy cyberspace operations globally to deter and defeat 
aggression and to ensure freedom of action to achieve military objectives in and through 
cyberspace, to organize and direct Navy cryptologic operations worldwide and support 
information operations and space planning and operations. Furthermore, the goal is to 
execute cyber missions as ordered and to direct, operate, maintain, secure, and defend 
the Navy’s portion of the Department of Defense Information Networks (DoDIN). By 
doing so, the organization will be able to deliver integrated cyber, information 
operations, cryptologic, and space capabilities to provide a common cyber operational 
picture. 
 
As directed by DOD Directive 5122.05, it is the policy of the DOD to make available 
timely and accurate information so that the public, Congress, and the news media may 
assess and understand the facts about national security and defense strategy. Requests 
for information from organizations and private citizens shall be answered in a timely 
manner. In carrying out the policy, the following principles of information will apply: 
 
A) Information will be made fully and readily available, consistent with statutory 
requirements, unless its release is precluded by current and valid security 
classification. The provisions of the Freedom of Information Act will be 
supported in both letter and spirit. 
B) A free flow of general and military information will be made available, 
without censorship or propaganda, to the men and women of the Armed 
Forces and their dependents. 
C) Information will not be classified or otherwise withheld to protect the U.S. 
government from criticism or embarrassment. 
D) Information will be withheld only when disclosure would adversely affect 
national security, threaten the safety or privacy of the men and women of the 
Armed Forces, or if otherwise authorized by statute or regulation. 
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E) The DOD’s obligation to provide the public with information on its major 
programs may require detailed public affairs planning and coordination 
within the DOD and with the other governmental agencies. The sole purpose 
of such activity is to expedite the flow of information to the public; 
propaganda has no place in the DOD public affairs programs. 
 
The Internet is a powerful information tool. The appearance, accuracy, currency, and 
relevance of the information presented by Navy and Marine Corps commands on the 
Internet reflect upon the Department of the Navy’s (DON’s) professional standards and 
credibility. Additionally, information residing on a Web server associated with a 
“navy.mil” or “marines.mil” domain is interpreted by the worldwide public, including 
the American taxpayer and media, as reflecting official Navy or Marine Corps policies or 
positions. Therefore, all information presented must be accurate, truthful, current and in 
compliance with DON public information policies. 
 
Official DON guidance with regard to publicly accessible Web presences is based on 
Federal law and specific DOD policy. This instruction applies to all DON commands and 
activities and all publicly-accessible DON website’s, related technologies, and Internet-
based capabilities (IbC), collectively termed as ‘web presences’, designed, developed, 
procured, or managed by DON activities or by their contractors. A designation of 
‘Unofficial’ is not recognized for any DON Web presence. 
 
A command presence within an IbC, while an official presence, is considered to be a part 
of that social media site and not an independent presence. IbC’s are defined as publicly 
accessible information capabilities and applications available across the Internet in 
locations not owned, operated, or controlled by the DOD or the Federal government. IbC 
include collaborative tools such as social networking sites (SNS), social media, user-
generated content, social software, Web-based email, instant messaging, and discussion 
forum. Some examples of IbC include YouTube, Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and Google 
applications among. 
 
Individual members of the DON are authorized to participate in or operate blogs or other 
social networking services. The DON recognizes the value of these communication 
channels in posting current information and supporting the morale of personnel, their 
families, and friends. As long as personnel adhere to specific restrictions on content, the 
DON encourages the use of blogs and social networking services, and recognizes this 
free flow of information contributes to legitimate transparency of the DON to the U.S. 
public whom the DON serves. In any instance in which an individual member of the DON 
is identified as such, either directly or indirectly, on a blog or other social media service, 
that individual is considered as representing the DON and must act accordingly. 
 
In addition to the types of information listed in paragraph 3c of Section 0702, the 
following information must not be displayed on personal IbC operated by individual 
members or on presences to which the individual may publish: 
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A) Any image, still or motion, of any military operation or activity unless that 
image is personal and has been cleared by the proper authority if there is a 
potential for a security or privacy violation. 
B) Language that may tend to diminish the confidence in or respect due to his or 
her superior officer(s), per the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
 
 
Marine Forces Cyber Command (MARFORCYBER) 
(United States Marine Corps, 2012) 
 
The U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) must continuously innovate to communicate in media-
intensive environments, to remain the nation’s force in readiness. This mission is based 
on the Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025 and the public affairs tasks outlined in the 
Marine Corps Service Campaign Plan for 2009–2015. While building and launching a 
social media program or accessing a favorite social media site can sometimes be fast, 
easy, and inexpensive. Existing rules for public affairs as well as personal conduct still 
apply. 
 
The USMC encourages Marines to explore and engage in social media communities at a 
level they feel comfortable with. The best advice is to approach online communication in 
the same way we communicate in person, by using sound judgment and common sense, 
adhering to the USMC’s core values of honor, courage and commitment, following 
established policy, and abiding by the UCMJ. While some may assert that social media 
has improved the way we connect and communicate as a culture, it presents dilemmas for 
USMC leaders, ranging from being a social media ‘friend’ of a subordinate to 
“following” those you lead. The point to consider, though, is that social media is about 
connecting. Just as USMC leaders may interact and function in their local community 
alongside their Marines, similar conduct holds true for interacting in the same social 
media spaces as their subordinates. It is how the connections and interactions take place 
with subordinates that set the tone for communication. Basically, online USMC 
relationships should function in the same manner as any professional relationship would. 
 
With social communication, you essentially provide a permanent record of what you say; 
if you wouldn’t say it in front of a formation, don’t say it online. If you come across 
evidence of a Marine violating command policy or the UCMJ on social media platforms, 
you should respond in the same manner you would if you witnessed the infraction in any 
other environment. When using social media tools and platforms, everything you say and 
do, as a leader is more visible and taken more seriously. As such, you have a greater 
responsibility to speak respectfully and intelligently about issues. Remember, when 
making statements online, you are being viewed as the authority on that topic and may 
appear to be speaking on behalf of the entire command or even as a spokesperson for the 
USMC, depending on the audience or venue.  
 
The following guidelines are must be followed if leadership decides to utilize social 
media: 
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A) Listen to active audiences to determine how to best engage. The paradigm of 
telling everyone what they need to know no longer carries significant weight 
when communicating via social media channels-social media requires, and 
begins with, listening. If you don’t know and understand the audiences you 
are communicating with, then the interaction will be of limited value. 
Listening to the online community and complying with DOD policies is 
paramount to communication success. 
B) You are key to uniting the voice of all Marines using social media speaking on 
behalf of your command. These Marines must have an accurate understanding 
of the information that should be communicated to the public in order to 
ensure accuracy, preserve safety, assure security, and establish credibility. 
C) The Corps’ actions are legitimate and, the assumption is, an informed public 
will agree with this principle. To strengthen this position, the Freedom of 
Information Act emphasizes the importance of transparency in military 
activities. We do not “spin” information or stories and do not condone 
manipulating the social media flow by creating posts designed to mislead 
followers or control a conversation. Every website, ‘fan page’, or other online 
destination managed by Marines must make that fact known to users. 
D) Marines and staff moderating and managing USMC online presences must be 
authorized to track and monitor the activity that takes place there. Just as you 
grant release authority for information by public affairs or unit information 
Marines, the same authority is applicable for command personnel 
representing your unit through social media. 
E) Timeliness is defined in terms of the information interests and demands of the 
public. Empower your Marines to anticipate these interests and effectively 
balance the timing of communications. The basic guidance for this concept 
applies both maximum disclosure and minimum delay. 
F) Security of operations, personnel, equipment, information, and facilities must 
be anticipated and evaluated before information is communicated to the 
public such as preventing the premature disclosure of dates, times and 
locations of deployments or deployed locations, and homecomings to and 
from the continental U.S. or ports of call. 
G) Privacy of individual service members must be protected. The Privacy Act of 
1974 set this principle into law. Marines must remain conscientious with 
regard to any personally identifiable information that we collect, including 
how we collect, store, use, or share that information; all which should be done 
pursuant to applicable privacy policy, laws and information technology rules. 
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